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Rempt: President’s Forum

Rear Admiral Rempt was raised in the Los Angeles suburb of Van Nuys and graduated from the U.S. Naval
Academy with the class of 1966. He holds master’s degrees in systems analysis from Stanford University and
in national security and strategic studies from the Naval
War College. Initial assignments at sea included deployments to Vietnam aboard USS Coontz (DLG 9)
and USS Somers (DDG 34). His first sea command was
USS Antelope (PG 86), one of four missile-armed patrol gunboats homeported in Naples, Italy.
Rear Admiral Rempt commanded USS Callaghan (DDG
994) during two western Pacific/Indian Ocean deployments, and USS Bunker Hill (CG 52), homeported in
Yokosuka, Japan. While aboard Bunker Hill, he served
for eighteen months as the Anti-Air Warfare Commander
for Seventh Fleet.
Duties ashore included three years in the weapon
prototyping office of the Naval Sea Systems Command
as the initial project officer for the Mark 41 Vertical
Launch System; on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) as program coordinator for the Aegis
Weapon System; as the director of the prospective commanding officer/executive officer department at the
Surface Warfare Officers Schools Command, in Newport; and as the Director, Anti-Air Warfare Requirements Division (OP-75) on the CNO’s staff. Rear Admiral
Rempt also served in the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, where he initiated the development of Naval
Theater Ballistic Missile Defense, continuing those efforts as Director, Theater Air Defense (N865) on the
CNO’s staff.
In July 1996 Rear Admiral Rempt assumed duties as
Program Executive Officer, Theater Air Defense, additionally serving as the U.S. Steering Committee member
for the Nato Seasparrow and Rolling Airframe Missile
multinational programs. In May 1998 he was assigned
as the first Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Theater Combat Systems; in that capacity he was the
principal advisor on the introduction of naval theater
ballistic missile defense and the development of advanced shipboard combat systems. In June 2000, Rear
Admiral Rempt was assigned as the first Assistant Chief
of Naval Operations for Missile Defense. In September
of that year, he additionally became Director, Surface
Warfare (N76), responsible for all surface warfare personnel initiatives, ship programs, and combat systems.
Rear Admiral Rempt assumed duties as the forty-eighth
President of the Naval War College on 22 August 2001.
His personal awards include the Legion of Merit (three
awards), the Meritorious Service Medal (three awards),
and the Navy Commendation Medal (three awards, the
second with combat V device).
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We know that this war is different in nature from any we have
fought in the past. It is not a war for territory, resources, or
hegemony.

THESE ARE MOMENTOUS TIMES. While I write this in late October, the

nation is at war. As President George W. Bush stated to a joint session of Congress on 20 September 2001: “We are a country awakened to danger and called to
defend freedom. Our grief has turned to anger and anger to resolution. Whether
we bring our enemies to justice, or justice to our enemies, justice will be done.”
It is both a great honor and a great responsibility to take command of the Naval War College at this point in history. To the faculty and staff of the Naval War
College and the Navy Warfare Development Command; to present and past students; and to our entire Navy and Marine Corps, as well as those of our allies and
friends, I promise I will do my utmost to provide sound guidance and strong encouragement in the months and years ahead. My assignment is a dream come
true—a chance to educate tomorrow’s leaders and to develop a vision of the future Navy they will command.
OUR MISSION
In Newport we have two clear, mutually supporting missions. One is to educate
the future leaders of our navy and our nation. Led by the Provost, Rear Admiral
Barbara McGann, our distinguished faculty and staff provide a world-class education—focusing on the principles of war. The credentials and accomplishments of our faculty are phenomenal, and the awards and accolades they have
received are too numerous to mention. I know they would be the first to insist,
however, that their greatest satisfaction lies in seeing their students who have
risen to high rank using their Naval War College education on behalf of our
great nation.
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Our other mission is to define the future of the Navy through the development of new operational concepts, experimentation at the fleet level, and refinement of tactical doctrine. The staff of the Navy Warfare Development Command,
led by Rear Admiral Bob Sprigg, is propelling the Navy into the twenty-first century. Together with the Strategic Studies Group, led by Admiral Jim Hogg, they
are working to define the next Navy and the Navy after next. Whether testing
new hull forms, conceiving unmanned air vehicles, or exploring the potential of
networks to allow real-time targeting, they are in the process of transforming
our service. This is exciting work!
These two missions—education of leaders and definition of the Navy—are
the key ingredients of keeping our Navy strong. They are especially pertinent as
the students of past classes wrestle with the great issues that face our nation in
the Terror War.
THE TERROR WAR
History has taught us—and our recent experiences in Vietnam, Iraq, Kosovo,
and elsewhere have confirmed—that we must clearly understand the fundamentals of war:

• Goals: our own, and those of our enemy;
• Strategies: alternate paths for achieving our goals and thwarting those of
our enemy;

• Assessment: how we know whether we are winning or losing;
• End-state: the situation we desire at the end of the war.
The table on the next page lists ten questions our strategic and political leaders must consider as we embark on a war. Armed conflict is a two-sided or
multisided endeavor, and outcomes cannot be guaranteed. Few go to war to lose,
but in a struggle between opposing sides, one is bound to lose. Considerable effort must be undertaken to ensure we have explored all the dimensions of national-level strategy and policy issues so that we clearly understand the context
in which we are fighting. In order to win, we need to know what we seek to accomplish and then ensure that the means are sufficient and appropriate to
achieve that end.
Identifying Our Enemies. President Bush has helped us in defining who our enemies are—not only terrorists and their support networks but, more importantly,
“nations that provide aid or safe havens to terrorism. . . . [A]ny nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a
hostile regime.” Some would believe that the notion of nation-states does not
apply in the Terror War. However, history reminds us that pirates, bandits, or
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QUESTIONS OF STRATEGY: THE TERROR WAR

others who live outside the law cannot
long survive if the state they live in pur1. What are U.S. goals and objectives?
• What must we do to win?
sues them with diligence. It is the safe haven and support of sympathetic nations
2. What are our enemies’ objectives?
that enable terrorists to go on. So it really
• What must they do to win?
does come down to nation-state versus
3. What kind of a war are we involved in?
nation-state—those that harbor terror• Resources? Influence? Ideology?
ists versus those that abhor them. States
4. Who or what are our enemies?
that support the rule of law cannot ratio• How do they assess us as adversaries?
nally support terrorism at the same time.
5. What are our enemies’ strategies?
Our president has called for waging
• What is their center of gravity?
war against any nation that continues to
harbor or support terrorists; such sup6. What should U.S. strategy be?
• What are the alternative approaches?
port is the terrorists’ center of gravity. If
we can dismantle their support structure,
7. What are our coalition objectives and strategy?
hound them mercilessly in every nation
• How important is coalition support?
of the earth, and go after any group or na8. For what purposes is military power applicable?
tion that supports them, our war will be
• How should we apply it?
successful. We will reach the point where
9. What end-state are we looking for?
terrorists cannot take refuge or have the
• What constitutes victory?
wherewithal to plan another sick event.
10. How can we assess how well we are doing?
The world will have ousted this cancer
• What are the metrics?
from our midst.
Of course, today only a few nations openly sponsor, support, or allow terrorists within their borders. The world rightfully has spoken out in indignation
against this menace to freedom and the rule of law. But rhetoric is not enough to
stop terrorists. States defiant in their support of terrorism must be compelled by
force to accept the rule of law embraced by the world.
Using Military Force. The president’s ultimatum was the proper first step to warn
complicit governments of our intention to use military force. The terrorists, their
support organizations, and the governments harboring them are subject to attack. How we use military force is, of course, critical. We must demonstrate that
our enemy is terrorists—not Afghans, Arabs, or Muslims—and we must do so in
word and deed, especially in our use of military force. We want to avoid encouraging more terrorist attacks through injuring innocent civilians, causing extensive
collateral damage, or committing human rights abuses. In this war, civilian casualties and general suffering among the Afghan population would probably embolden support for the terrorists. In this case “a little stick,” judiciously applied,
may be much more effective than the “big stick” of large-scale attacks.
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Once our overall war aims and resulting strategies are in place, defining suitable and achievable objectives for military action will become critical. In this we
will have to curb our expectations of what military force might actually accomplish; not all our goals are achievable with bullets and bombs. Designing a successful military campaign against
the shadowy and elusive worldThe terrorists who attacked the United States
wide terrorist network is a tall
on September 11 aimed at one nation but
challenge. In the end, the overall
wounded an entire world. Rarely, if ever, has
the world been as united as it was on that ter- effort will have to be political,
rible day. It was a unity born of horror, of fear, diplomatic, and even economic if
of outrage, and of profound sympathy with the we are to achieve the president’s
goal of finding, stopping, and deAmerican people. This unity also reflected the
feating “every terrorist group of
fact that the World Trade Center, in this
global reach.”
uniquely international city, was home to men
We know that this war is differand women of every faith from some 60 nations.
ent in nature from any we have
This was an attack on all humanity, and all
fought in the past. It is not a war for
humanity has a stake in defeating the forces
territory, resources, or hegemony. It
behind it.
KOFI A. ANNAN, 21 September 2001
is a war of freedom against tyranny,
justice against mass murder, open
markets and capitalism against malnutrition and unrelieved poverty. Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld helped define how we will know we have won: “The
ultimate victory in this war is when everyone who wants to can . . . get up, let your
children go to school, go out of the house and not in fear, stand here on a sidewalk
and not worry about a truck bomb driving into us.”
What we are fighting for are our basic beliefs and freedoms as Americans, the
freedoms guaranteed us by our Constitution, Bill of Rights, and the democratic
rule of law. These freedoms were violently taken away from those who died in
lower Manhattan and the Pentagon. That is why we must act.

RODNEY P. REMPT

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
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